Slouching Toward Disarmament

Every American president talks rhetorically about nuclear disarmament. It' a polite way to cloak the iron fist in a velvet glove. But none until Barack Obama has been reckless and naive enough to pursue this in practice, in the vain (and I mean it both ways) hope that the rest of the world will disarm right along with us.

While all eyes were riveted on an audacious domestic agenda, Obama has promulgated a policy change, and negotiated a treaty with Russia, that makes nuclear disarmament through intentional neglect official U.S. policy. It's a decision our grandchildren will rue as one of the worst of his presidency.

From last week's New York Times:

"Discussing his approach to nuclear security the day before formally releasing his new strategy, Mr. Obama described his policy as part of a broader effort to edge the world toward making nuclear weapons obsolete, and to create incentives for countries to give up any nuclear ambitions. To set an example, the new strategy renounces the development of any new nuclear weapons, overruling the initial position of his own defense secretary."

Previous presidents have signed treaties reducing the number of U.S. warheads (and a further reduction in numbers might even make sense). But none ever before renounced the development of new weapons to replace old ones, which amounts to incremental disarmament by default. It's a dangerous decision, with huge implications. The only hope we have is that cooler heads in Congress will reject the new "nuclear posture review" and refuse to fund implementation. It can also leave the arms reduction treaty with Russia unratified, saving Obama from his fecklessness.

The treaty makes a virtue of necessity, since large reductions in U.S. nuclear forces will soon become unavoidable, because our "science-based stockpile stewardship" program has failed. We no longer can verify the safety and reliability of an aging arsenal, which hasn't seen a major modernization or innovation since the late 1980s. Computer simulations were supposed to give us the same level of assurances we formerly received from real-world testing. But that was just another techie pipe dream. Much of the arsenal is now beyond its design life expectancy. It's degrading (perhaps dangerously) in place. Computer simulations can't provide real world assurances. A situation I anticipated years ago, in pieces like this and this, is coming to pass.

Unfortunately, most commentary on the policy shift has focused on the issue of first use and targeting and the number of warheads. But that all becomes irrelevant if, in 10 or 20 or 30 years, we don't have reliable warheads and delivery systems to make the deterrent credible (or to deliver the goods, if a major conflict breaks out). Designing and deploying nuclear weapons isn't an off-the-cuff (or off the shelf) endeavor. Reversing the present decline will be immensely costly, politically controversial and could prove impossible, given the brain drain and experience deficit our national labs have suffered during this extended period of inactivity. Much of the specialized infrastructure and expertise required to modernize might be impossible to recover.

Arms reductions are probably desirable. But even a smaller arsenal will at some point need to be modernized, in order to maintain safety and reliability (not to mention a credible deterrent) -- unless Obama intends to cobble together our future force with salvage parts and scotch tape.

A weapons expert I interviewed years ago, in my reporting days, used this analogy to describe the approach we're taking. Go out today and buy a Ferrari, he said. Then, park it in your garage for 35 years. Don't drive it. Don't service it. Look under the hood occasionally, if you like, but replace no parts. Now, bet your life and the safety of your family on that Ferrari roaring back to life, and functioning perfectly, when an emergency strikes, 35 years hence. That's the gamble we're taking with our nuclear forces, according to the expert.

The policy of disarmament by neglect can't all be laid at Obama's throne. Two blundering Bushes and one Bill Clinton also refused to upgrade the arsenal, with the full complicity of no-nuke retreads in Congress, choosing to abide by an unratified test ban treaty that makes it nearly impossible to verify the toll that time is taking on our mothballed weapons. The test ban also makes it nearly impossible to field next generation weapons -- at least if we want to be sure that they go "boom" when we want them to.

I suppose fumbling away the nuclear football, through disarmament by disintegration, will be hailed by unreconstructed no-nukers, who now have one of their own in the White House. But if they imagine that our present and future geopolitical rivals will follow our lead, they're due for a shock. The test ban will be broken before long -- probably by Russia -- providing another Sputnik moment. But it's doubtful we'll have the will to respond, given the controversy and costs a modernization effort will generate.

We're settling for second or third or fourth as an economic power; we'll settle for second or third or fourth as a military power too. According to the Obama Doctrine, our moral standing in the world will rise as our economic and military power declines. The true demonstration of our virtue and our strength is to gracefully surrender first place.

The nuclear arms race won't end simply because the former frontrunner decides he's too old and winded and lazy to carry on. If Obama gets two terms, we'll be lucky to be also-rans.

Test of Resolve

The distant echo you heard one week ago wasn't just a nuclear device being detonated in North Korea. It was the sound of a naive and dangerous policy position toppled from its pedestal, shattering the delusion that America can contain the worldwide proliferation of nuclear arms by letting our own atomic arsenal fall into decline.

Boom goes an international test ban. Boom goes Barack Obama's fantasy of a nuclear-free world. Boom go the arguments against modernizing our own nuclear stockpile. Splat goes the egg on the faces of those who imagined the international arms race would end just because America opted out.

America's adherence to a never-ratified nuclear test ban is predicated on a false hope -- that our declining to test (and to modernize, since the two go hand in hand) would encourage similar restraint among other superpowers and superpower wanna-bes. The no nukes crowd assured us that by setting a good example, and putting our own nuclear program into mothballs, international tensions would ease and fewer nations would covet the ultimate weapon.

But our fine, upstanding example didn't deter North Korea from its nuclear ambitions. It will fail to dissuade Iran from testing, if Israel doesn't strike first. And it's only a matter of time -- as I predicted in this blog months ago -- before a resurgent Russia also returns to testing, as it pursues its own modernization effort.

That leaves America standing there, indignant but impotent, reduced to wagging its finger and delivering pious lectures, hypocritically, about the evils of other nations developing weapons it has had for more than 60 years. These other nations aren't going to sacrifice their national security interests because America will. It was folly to believe they would. A continuation of the nuclear arms race is inevitable. It's time to accept it and begin modernizing our nuclear weapons infrastructure and arsenal.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration is moving us in the opposite direction. While North Korea tests, Obama just proposed the de-funding of a program vital to U.S. modernization. His budget canceled the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, leaving the country with an arsenal of aging warheads whose safety and functionality will degrade over time. "The Administration proposes to cancel development of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) -- a new design warhead intended to replace the current inventory of nuclear weapons -- because it is not consistent with Presidential commitments to move towards a nuclear-free world," according to the budget.

Congress cut off funding for the program in fiscal 2009, at the behest of Democrats who understand that modernizing might eventually force a return to testing. Computer simulations can only get you so far when it comes to assuring warhead reliability. And this task becomes vastly more complicated, and problematic, as these very specialized devices age beyond their design life expectancy, as many are. Upgrading the arsenal would almost certainly require more testing, which would upset environmentalists and the nuclear disarmament crowd. They seem adamant about sticking with a test ban, even though events are proving that it isn't working as intended.

The no nukes crowd is bent on a course of disarmament by default; the gradual downsizing of America's arsenal by allowing it to fall into disrepair and decay. This policy is un-stated, naturally, but already well underway, as weapons are being removed from the field not because of treaty obligations, or any strategic plan, but due to uncertainty about their safety and reliability.

Congress shares responsibility for blocking modernization efforts. But Obama need not go along with this folly. Obama's budget also nixed funding for design work on the next generation bomber (which has a certain perverse logic, if you intend to let our nuclear weapons rot in place) and the Yucca Mountain nuclear repository in Nevada, which, although not directly linked to weapons work, brings a halt to the quest for long-term storage of nuclear materials.

All recent presidents have wished for a nuclear-free world. It's as much a part of the job as pardoning the White House turkey just before Thanksgiving. But all recent presidents until Obama also understood that this was a rhetorical exercise, given geopolitical realities. At a time when America should be showing the world resolve, Obama is signaling retreat. At a time when the arms race is back on, America is asleep in the starting blocks, confident that it's long lead in the race guarantees that deterrence will hold. What some Americans don't want to acknowledge is that this is a marathon, not a sprint. And we're still a long way from safely crossing the finish line.

Disarmament by Default -- an Update

Most would agree that the continued downsizing of Cold War-era nuclear arsenals is a good thing, if undertaken with care. But it's embarrassing to see the U.S. pushing -- or is it groveling? -- for a new round of arms control reductions with Russia, by necessity rather than choice, because we've permitted our capabilities to decline to the point that their safety and reliability can't be assured.

Secretary of Defense Bill Gates "says the next American president should pursue a new agreement with Russia to further reduce the size of both nations' nuclear weapons arsenals," the Associated Press reported a few days ago. ". . . Gates spoke Tuesday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he said the long-term outlook for keeping U.S. nuclear weapons safe and reliable is 'bleak,' in part because the United States is experiencing a brain drain in the laboratories that design and develop the world's most powerful weapons. Gates said America's more than 5,000 nuclear weapons are now safe and secure, but he sketched out a series of concerns about the future, while stressing that nuclear weapons must remain a viable part of the U.S. strategy for deterring attack as long as other countries have them."

As if this isn't alarming enough, Gates also said "he is concerned about the possibility that some Russian nuclear weapons from the old Soviet arsenal may not be fully accounted for," indicating that the United States isn't the only nuclear power that might have become a little sloppy following the momentary easing of Cold War tensions. "I have fairly high confidence that no strategic or modern tactical nuclear weapons have leaked" beyond Russian borders, Gates said -- that's a relief! "What worries me are the tens of thousands of old nuclear mines, nuclear artillery shells and so on, because the reality is the Russians themselves probably don't have any idea how many of those they have or, potentially, where they are."

That American weapons aren't in the most capable hands is also evident, as my earlier posts on this subject indicate. Just yesterday, in fact, another alarming story of "nuclear decline" and nuclear neglect ran in our local paper, The Colorado Springs Gazette.

It's a situation I've been following -- and warning about -- for years: link, link, link, link.

Gates emphasized that the current U.S. arsenal is "safe, secure and reliable," but worried aloud about "the long-term prognosis," which he characterizes as "bleak." "He noted that the United States has not designed a new nuclear weapon since the 1980s and has not built a new one since 1992," reports the AP, and he "called for urgent action to reverse a decline in focus on nuclear issues."

"Currently the United States is the only declared nuclear power that is neither modernizing its nuclear arsenal nor has the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead," Gates said. "To be blunt, there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program."

It's troubling that this hasn't become a major issue in the presidential race -- is it too late in the game to make it one? -- because it's shaping up as one of the major challenges the winner will confront. It might even help precipitate the "crisis" that Joe Biden and others are predicting, if our adversaries decide to "test" the young and inexperienced Barack Obama.

I'm predicting -- clip this post and tape it to the refrigerator -- that the Russians will resume nuclear testing within a few years. That will be the "Sputnik Moment" that reawakens America to the fact that the nuclear arms race isn't over, and that Cold War II is a reality. How the next president and next Congress respond will determine whether the U.S. continues as a military superpower, or chooses the easier course of decline and disarmanent by default.

This would seem to be an issue that plays to McCain's advantage, since he is perceived as the more capable candidate on national security issues. Of the two men, he's the most politically courageous -- a quality the next president will need if it becomes necessary to resume nuclear testing. But even that isn't certain in this topsy-turvy political climate.

Many Americans seem convinced, based on scanty evidence, that Barack Obama is the better choice for managing the economy. Maybe they also think he has the right stuff to manage the next arms race, and can handle a showdown with a snarling Russian bear, emerging from hibernation.

Another Sign of American Decline

This report by The Associated Press (also pasted below) confirms something I've been predicting for years -- though I take no delight in being vindicated.

It's long been obvious that the United States was pursuing a policy of what I call "disarmament by default," through benign neglect of our nuclear forces, by adhering to a never-ratified test ban treaty, mothballing its nuclear programs, retiring or cashiering its top nuclear experts and allowing its nuclear labs and manufacturing facilities to fall into decline. (I pitched this story to the New York Times Magazine back in 2000 or 2001; an editor politely declined to go with it, apparently failing to see the relevance.)

It's partly the fault of recent presidents, who didn't have the political courage to return to real world testing, and who believed, rather naively, that we could maintain the safety and reliability of an aging nuclear arsenal through computer simulations. None of them wanted to remind Cold War-fatigued Americans that we still had a deterrent force to maintain, modernize and upgrade, and they feared that arsenal modernization would be seen as provocative by some in the "international community." Better to let sleeping dogs lie.

But Congress also shares much of the blame, for permitting a handful of members -- unreconstructed "No Nukes" types -- to defund or otherwise stymie most recent efforts to modernize the arsenal.

Both branches of government acted irresponsibly, on the assumption that the end of Cold War I also meant the end of the nuclear arms race. Technocrats in the nuclear labs went along, intrigued by the computing challenges presented by the "Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship" program and perhaps hoping to shed the taint of being known as Bomb builders.

And now we find ourselves in a potential crisis.

Neither presidential candidate has much of substance to say on the subject, the AP reports, because it's an issue still below the radar of most Americans. The story notes, however, that "of the two senators competing to succeed President Bush, Democrat Barack Obama is most unequivocally against building new nuclear weapons."

That may be one of several campaign trail policy positions that a President Obama will have to modify or abandon once the weight and responsibility of the office is sitting squarely on his shoulders. Or perhaps he and Democrats in Congress will be content to stand by as more and more elements of America's once mighty nuclear arsenal become too aged, too unsafe and too unreliable to remain on alert, consciously embracing the policy of disarmament by default.

US considering implications of nuclear decline

By ROBERT BURNS

WASHINGTON -- The mighty U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons, midwived by World War II and nurtured by the Cold War, is declining in power and purpose while the military's competence in handling the world's most dangerous arms has eroded. At the same time, international efforts to contain the spread of such weapons look ineffective.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, for one, wants the next president to think about what nuclear middle-age and decline means for national security.

Gates joins a growing debate about the reliability and future credibility of the American arsenal with his first extensive speech on nuclear arms Tuesday. The debate is attracting increasing attention inside the Pentagon even as the military is preoccupied with fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The unconventional tools of war there include covert commandos, but not nuclear weapons.

Gates is expected to call for increased commitment to preserving the deterrent value of atomic weapons. Their chief function has evolved from first stopping the Nazis and Japanese, then the Soviets. Now the vast U.S. stockpile serves mainly to make any other nation think twice about developing or using even a crude nuclear device of its own.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, wrote in the current issue of an internal publication, Joint Force Quarterly, that the United States is overdue to retool its nuclear strategy. He referred to nuclear deterrence _ the idea that the credible threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation is enough by itself to stop a potential enemy from striking first with a weapon of mass destruction.

"Many, if not most, of the individuals who worked deterrence in the 1970s and 1980s _ the real experts at this discipline _ are not doing it anymore," Mullen wrote. "And we have not even tried to find their replacements."

Gen. Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which is responsible for maintaining the nation's nuclear war plans, told Congress last spring that technical nuclear expertise also is lagging. "The last nuclear design engineer to participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon is scheduled to retire in the next five years," Chilton said.

Of the two senators competing to succeed President Bush, Democrat Barack Obama is most unequivocally against building new nuclear weapons. Both he and Republican John McCain say in their campaign materials that they support the long-standing U.S. commitment to eventually do away with nuclear arms. Neither says explicitly that the safety or credibility of the arsenal is in question; that's an argument made most frequently by congressional Republicans.

Sen. John Kyl, R-Ariz., for example, said in a speech Sept. 15 that the network of laboratories and industrial plants that produce and maintain U.S. nuclear weapons is, in some cases, "simply falling down from age," and that this amounts to an alarming national "emergency."

Some private experts dispute Kyl's assessment. "It's completely overblown," said Hans M. Kristensen, who tracks nuclear weapons developments for the Federation of American Scientists. The advocacy group opposes the Bush administration's proposal to develop a new nuclear weapon design.

The number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal is a state secret. But Kristensen and a fellow expert, Robert S. Norris, estimate that the total stood at nearly 5,400 warheads at the start of this year. That includes an estimated 4,075 ready for potential use and 1,260 in backup status.
In an interview, Kristensen argued that even though the number is declining, the capability of remaining weapons is increasing as older missiles, for example, get new engines, guidance sets and computer software.

Gates takes a different view. He has expressed concern about lack of official attention to the nuclear arsenal.

"Even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, as long as other nations possess the bomb and the means to deliver it, the United States must maintain a credible strategic deterrent," he said Sept. 29 in a speech at the National Defense University.
Gates tied the question of credibility to well-publicized slip-ups in Air Force nuclear operations. In June he fired the Air Force's top general, Michael Moseley, as well as the top civilian, Michael Wynne, after an outside investigation concluded that the Air Force had not adequately heeded warning signs that its nuclear expertise, performance and stewardship were eroding over a period of years.

In August 2007, a B-52 bomber flew from an Air Force base in North Dakota to a base in Louisiana with nuclear warheads that neither the bomber's pilots nor its crew knew were aboard. Then came the revelation that electrical fuses that trigger the detonation of strategic nuclear missiles had been shipped mistakenly to Taiwan _ and the mistake was not discovered for months.

Richard Wagner, a physicist who worked in the government's nuclear weapons laboratories for many years, told a conference in Washington this past week that the August 2007 incident was "the worst breach of security of nuclear weapons that the United States has ever had."